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In this paper, we compare the present process of definition and implementation of fiscal 
policies  in  the  European  Union  with  the  main  conclusions  of  the  “fiscal  federalism” 
theory. This is done in order to draw possible lessons for future evolution, particularly 
taking into account the possibility of creating a European “Federation of Nation-States”, 
which we supported in a previous work. 
 
We argue that these main conclusions are easily compatible with the emergence of a 
largely decentralised “Federation”, but are still far distant from the present situation. In 
this context, we argue for several important lines of change in the short-run, namely an 
effective change in the process of coordinating fiscal policies and a credible reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, and in the medium-long-run, namely an important increase in 
the size of the European budget. 
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1. Introduction 
Almost 60 years have gone by since Robert Schuman’s famous speech (Schuman, 1963), 
in which he described the “European federation” as the ultimate goal of the integration 
process that was beginning at that time. However, the results of this process are clearly 
different for the two perspectives that comprise it: economics and politics.  
 
In economic terms, advances have been made at a good pace, and the European Union 
(EU) is now in the most advanced state of economic integration possible, with the single 
currency,  free  movement  of  goods,  services,  capital  and  people  and  several  common 
policies. However, these advances have not been matched in the political field, where the 
Union has, in fact, failed to establish a strong entity and to develop common actions with 
a similar impact. 
 
This  divergence  is  a  fundamental  trait  of  the  present  EU  situation,  which  might  be 
characterised as a crossroads: along with the above mentioned advances, there are four 
aspects  in  which  the  results  fall  well  short  of  what  would  be  desirable,  or  four 
fundamental  deficits:  “competitiveness  and  economic  growth”,  even  if  the  situation 
seems to be changing in last few months: “political weight”, with the EU often behaving 
as a “dwarf” on the international political scene; “legitimacy and participation”, in view 
of  the  poor  scrutiny  of  some  European  institutions,  ambiguity  in  the  sharing  of 
competences between Member States and the EU and indifference of citizens facing the 
process of integration; and “capacity for decision and action”, faced with unsuccessful 
institutional reforms and the permanence of a poor-sized community budget. 
 
These “deficits”, particularly the last three, show that the goal of creating an expanded 
space  of  European  solidarity,  which  would  give  rise  to  a  political  entity  and  a  true 
European citizenship, remains well out of the EU’s reach. 50 years after the Treaty of 
Rome, the weight of national interests is often still predominant, which means that these 
“deficits” will be difficult to overcome unless there is a significant change in the Union’s   4 
politico-institutional organisation model. That is to say, unless there is a rebalance in the 
two sides of the integration process, with a deepening of the political field. 
 
In previous studies, (e.g. Alves, 2007) we defended that this rebalance would involve the 
EU becoming an organisation capable of dealing efficiently with the need for unity in 
clearly supranational fields, without endangering European diversity, and that the most 
suitable model for doing so would be that of a “Federation of Member States”, with 
highly decentralised competences. 
 
Such evolution would have to be accompanied, at the level of economic organisation, by 
a growing approximation to the “rules” of the theory of fiscal federalism. This is the 
context in which we present this paper, whose main topic is the comparison between the 
present process of defining and implementing fiscal policies in Europe and the one that 
should result from the application of these “rules”, thus with a focus on the function of 
macroeconomic stabilisation.  
 
If we add to this comparison some elements related to the functions of supply of public 
goods and services and redistribution and to the exercise of democratic legitimacy, it 
becomes possible to analyse the gap between the method of economic organisation in the 
European Union and that which should correspond to a “Federation of Nation States”.  
 
That is the overall aim of this paper. It begins with a brief look at the literature on fiscal 
federalism, establishing its fundamental traits and possible implications for the European 
case  (section  2).  The  paper  continues  by  presenting  the  essential  elements  of  the 
European Union’s economic organisation, with particular emphasis on the discussions 
concerning fiscal discipline and the size of the community budget (section 3). The path is 
then open to analyse the essential question: “how far is this economic organisation from 
that resulting from the theory of fiscal federalism (section 4). It concludes with some 
final remarks and implications for the future (section 5). 
 
   5 
2. The theory of fiscal federalism: what major lessons for the EU? 
As Oates (1999) points out, the use of the term “federalism” in Economics is somewhat 
different to its normal use in Political Science. In the latter, it refers to a political system 
with a Constitution that guarantees a set of principles and proceeds to the sharing of 
competences between the various levels of power. In the case of Economics, all public 
sectors  are  relatively  “federalised”,  given  that  all  of  them  provide  public  goods  and 
services  and  have  some  autonomy  of  decision:  it  deals,  then,  essentially  with  the 
questions that involve the vertical structuring of the public sector. 
 
In  this  context,  the  fundamental  aim  is  to  find  the  most  suitable  way  of  sharing 
responsibilities and of using instruments through the various levels of “government”, so 
as to optimise their performance. 
 
As  there  are  clearly  no  rules  or  rigid  formulas  that  determine  a  situation  of  “fiscal 
optimum”,  which  is  highlighted  by  the  diversity  of  fiscal  structures  in  the  various 
federations (similarly, in fact, to the case of political and institutional structures), the 
literature in the framework of the so-called “fiscal federalism” has attempted to find some 
guidelines for the vertical structuring of government. 
 
The essential purpose of this literature is, therefore, the suitable sharing of competences 
among  the  various  levels  of  government  (and  not,  as  it  may  sometimes  seem,  fiscal 
decentralisation for itself alone), or, as Oates (1998) says, identifying the institutional 
design that will best allow the public sector to respond to the variety of the demand aimed 
at it. 
 
Traditionally, the theory of fiscal federalism is concerned with three essential aspects: the 
sharing of functions between the different levels of government  - particularly at four 
levels  (Spahn,  1994):  supply  of  public  goods  and  services;  redistribution  of  income; 
macroeconomic stabilisation; and taxation - the identification of welfare gains resulting 
from fiscal decentralisation; and the use of the instruments of fiscal policy (particularly 
issues associated with taxation and inter-governmental transfers).   6 
 
Through time, the field of fiscal federalism has been broadened as other topics emerged, 
including,  among  others,  questions  related  to  inter-jurisdictional  competition  and 
“environmental  federalism”  (e.g.  Enrich,  1996;  Oates  and  Schwabb,  1996),  “market 
preserving  federalism”  (e.g.  Weingast,  1995;  McKinnon,  1997)  or  decentralisation  in 
developing economies or those in transition (e.g. Bahl and Linn, 1992; Shah, 1994). 
 
Briefly  analysing  these  fundamental  topics  of  the  theory  of  “fiscal  federalism”,  it  is 
possible to find some elements that should be determinant in structuring the competences 
of the various levels of power within the EU context, particularly taking into account a 
possible evolution towards a federalist model. 
 
The main conclusions of the theory of “fiscal federalism” seem largely compatible with 
the idea of the evolution of the EU towards a broadly decentralised federal model (the 
“Federation of Nation-States”) and for the need to, in this context, create a “European 
economic government” that would be responsible for competences assigned, in this field, 
to the central level of power.  
 
Similarly, they seem to sustain the idea that is possible to obtain significant welfare gains 
through the creation of such a strongly decentralised federal fiscal system, provided that 
it  is  suitably  designed  and  taking  into  account  aims  of  equity  and  efficiency.  In  this 
design of the Federation’s vertical structure at the fiscal and budgetary level, the aspects 
below  would  be  decisive  for  the  success  of  the  model,  taking  into  account  the  main 
elements of the available literature. 
 
In the first place, the need for a clear and transparent application of the principle of 
subsidiarity, in terms of the question of the supply of public goods and services, with 
centralisation  occurring  for  a  small  number  of  policies,  those  that  have  clear 
supranational nature (such as defence, security and monetary policy, among other fields). 
This would avoid too much “central” intervention (Oates, 1972), something that may 
have happened in the European case within the present institutional model.   7 
 
In this field, the (still) marked diversity in demands and national preferences, plus the 
(still) low mobility of families should not put the gains of decentralisation at risk (Spahn, 
1994): they will probably even highlight them, since they will not cause exaggerated 
distortions  (Flatters  et  al.,  1974).  In  fact,  even  if  there  were  spill  over  effects,  the 
advantage of cooperation among the different levels of government that are closest to 
citizens could easily outbalance the centralised solution. 
 
Still within the context of competence sharing in the scope of the supply of public goods 
and services, despite the validity of the decentralisation principle, there seems to be a 
need, in some fields, to take particular care with certain negative consequences resulting 
from competition between the Federation Members, as it eventually would lead to poorer 
standards (Enrich, 1996). In the European case, this would be particularly noticeable in 
the  fiscal  and  environmental  fields,  where  these  consequences  have  recently  been 
established, and would justify greater centralisation and harmonisation. 
 
In  the  second  place,  the  need  to  combine  some  centralisation  at  the  level  of  the 
redistribution  function  (Tiebout,  1956),  maintaining  a  significant  space  for 
decentralisation,  taking  into  account  various  motives:  reduced  geographic  mobility; 
failure of some sub-national programs of redistribution (e.g. Feldstein and Wrobel, 1998, 
for the case of the USA); extended aims of the regional redistribution function (King, 
1984); and the added concern with the most disadvantaged that are closer (Pauly, 1973), 
which could be an important issue in the European case since it deals with different 
countries (and regions), with different traditions, values and histories (or rather, once 
again diversity justifying some degree of decentralisation).  
 
In this context, a summary of the main theoretical and empirical references in this field 
seems to suggest that, in the case of the European Union, the redistribution policy would 
be maintained at the national level, particularly with regard to individual redistribution, 
while  there  would  also  be  some  space  for  inter-regional  redistribution,  namely  via 
transfers through the community budget.   8 
 
Thirdly, the need to assess the real importance of the fiscal policy for the purposes of 
macroeconomic  stabilisation  (Solow,  2004).  The  literature  in  the  scope  of  fiscal 
federalism traditionally postulates the importance of a significant central budget, which, 
through  the  transfer  mechanisms  between  the  States/regions  positively  affected  by 
asymmetric shocks and the States/regions negatively affected by the same shocks, seems 
to exercise an important degree of stabilisation (Spahn, 1994). This has, in fact, been 
established  through  several  studies,  in  the  wake  of  the  analyses  of  Sala-i-Martin  and 
Sachs (1992), Italianer and Pisani-Ferry (1994), and Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and, 
who estimated, based on different methodologies, a significant degree of stabilisation in 
the absorption of shocks by the North-American federal budget. 
 
The same type of role was mentioned by subscribers to the theory of optimal currency 
areas (following the seminal works of Mundell, 1961, and Kenen, 1969), who considered 
that, once the monetary and exchange instruments were lost, an efficient response to the 
negative effects of specific and asymmetric shocks, in the context of a monetary union, 
would only be obtained through one of three mechanisms: broad flexibility of prices and 
salaries; strong mobility of labour; or fiscal transfers via a wide central budget. Since 
these do not exist (or, at least, only in a weak situation), the solution would be to move to 
national fiscal policies with high flexibility. 
 
As a result of these elements, and with regard to the EU, it becomes relevant to discuss 
the best way of pursuing aims of macroeconomic stabilisation, knowing the difficulties at 
the level of labour mobility and the flexibility of some labour markets, as well as the 
significant  difficulties  of  a  political  nature  in  promoting  both  a  broadening  of 
centralisation and expansion of the Union budget. 
 
In  the  fourth  place,  at  the  level  of  the  instruments  of  fiscal  federalism,  it  is  worth 
highlighting the existence of a set of relevant elements: the existence of certain guidelines 
(namely, the criteria defined by Musgrave, 1983) for a potential design of a “European” 
fiscal  system,  despite  criticisms  of  the  traditional  criteria  and  the  obvious  political   9 
difficulties (Alves, 2000); and the need to promote conditional transfers for internalising 
spill over effects (Oates, 1999).  
 
There is also the need to take into account the problems, namely political ones, generated 
by transfers, whose aim is that of “fiscal equalisation” (e.g. McKinnon, 1997; Usher, 
1995) and, as such, the concern with a certain trade-off between the goals of greater 
homogeneity of the levels of economic growth and economic and social cohesion and the 
problems deriving from the existence of taxpayers and net receivers. Finally, the need for 
some care in constructing the mechanism(s) of “income sharing”, without the associated 
transfer system(s) being too broad, so as not to encourage increasing budgetary laxity. 
 
In the fifth place, some literature, following the pioneer work by Inman and Rubinfeld 
(1997) and considering both economic and political goals, seems to highlight the idea 
favourable  to  a  largely  decentralised  federal  system,  indicating  the  possibility  of 
strengthening citizens’ political participation, which could overcome the possible costs 
associated with a reduction in economic efficiency. This could be particularly relevant in 
the European case, where there is a significant challenge in the field of legitimacy and 
democratic participation. 
 
Finally, some literature  also indicates that, under certain conditions, federalism could 
constitute the best system for preserving and developing the market economy (Weingast, 
1995). Taking the European case, this might point toward a situation where the creation 
of  a  Federation  would  positively  contribute  towards  strengthening  European 
competitiveness.  
 
In particular, it points to the fact that there seems to be a need for special attention to the 
problem of fiscal discipline in sub-central governments (in this case, of the Member-
States).  In  any  case,  it  shows  that  it  could  be  enough  to  combine  the  prohibition  of 
monetary  financing  of  the  debt  and  bail-out  behaviours  on  the  part  of  the  federal 
government with the non-existence of exaggerated intergovernmental transfers and with 
the efficient functioning of credit markets to generate responsible behaviour in the sub-  10 
central fiscal authorities (McKinnon, 1997). In other words, applied to the European case, 
it indicates that it might not be necessary to define rules like those resulting from the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, European Council, 1997). 
 
3. Fiscal policy(ies) in the EU: the present situation  
Having analysed some major lessons that the theory of fiscal federalism may contain for 
the EU’s economic organisation, and before moving on to assess the gap between the 
present situation and that which would result from an application of this theory, a brief 
description of the present organisational context of the euro zone is relevant. This is done 
below, firstly by approaching the issue of the European solution for fiscal policies and, 
then, with a brief reference to the issue of community budget size. 
 
In  terms  of  fiscal  policy  (and,  therefore,  the  macroeconomic  stabilisation  in  view  of 
specific or asymmetric shocks), the European solution was provided for in the Treaty on 
European Union (1992). This foresaw that fiscal policies would remain in the hands of 
national  governments,  albeit  limited  by  compulsory  rules  (particularly,  restricting  the 
public deficit to no more than 3% of GDP and the public debt to under 60% of GDP), 
complemented  by  their  coordination  at  the  level  of  the  Council.  It  also  foresaw  the 
prohibition of monetary financing of public deficits and instituted a clause of national 
responsibility for the public debt (no bail-out). 
 
This solution was designed to maintain a policy instrument that could be used at national 
level and, at the same time, to prevent excessive public deficits from being created and 
maintained (through restrictive rules) and to promote some coherence among the various 
national  fiscal  policies  and  between  these  and  the  single  monetary  policy  (through  a 
coordination mechanism). 
 
In 1997, the SGP came to reinforce this option, particularly in terms of limiting freedom 
of activity. Thus, its preventive mechanism assumed budgetary balance as a medium-
term goal,  allowing automatic stabilisers to act and opening room for manoeuvre for 
some  discretion  in  handling  fiscal  policy,  namely  when  a  less  favourable  economic   11 
evolution  occurs.  On  the  other  hand,  its  corrective  mechanism  established  in  a  more 
concrete  way  the  mode  of  operation  for  “excessive  deficit  procedure”,  in  particular 
defining the sanctions to be imposed and clarifying situations of exception. 
 
This  solution  has  been  the  target  of  wide  discussion  and  great  criticism,  at  both  the 
academic and political level, particularly prior to 1995 and after 2000, periods in which 
there was greater economic difficulty. The discussion has fundamentally focused round 
the way fiscal discipline would be implemented and controlled (e.g. Buiter et al., 1993; 
Rubio and Figueras, 1998) and not on the need for this discipline. 
 
Thus, fiscal discipline is seen largely as necessary for preserving the stability of monetary 
union, which would be compromised if countries promoted excessive public deficits (De 
Grauwe, 2005). This situation could determine significant external effects, namely via an 
increase in the Union’s interest rate and possible pressures on the central bank in the 
sense of making monetary policy more flexible. On the other hand, the possible incentive 
to free-riding behaviour determined by the fact that everyone in a single currency context 
could  share  the  costs  of  a  bad  budgetary  behaviour,  and  the  possibility  of  creating 
excessive deficits for political reasons, would constitute additional elements in favour of 
a solution that would promote fiscal discipline. 
 
This consensus was not shared concerning the way in which fiscal discipline should be 
implemented. This has been the main topic of a great controversy, both among defenders 
of the present rules (e.g. Begg et al., 2004; Buti et al., 2003) and defenders of relatively 
profound  reforms  (e.g.  Casella,  1999;  Arestis  et  al.,  2001;  Creel,  2003;  Pisani-Ferry, 
2004; Collignon, 2004; Wyplosz, 2005).  
 
Criticism to the original SGP reached a peak in 2002 when the President of the European 
Commission  at  the  time,  Romano  Prodi,  classified  it  as  “stupid”  (Prodi,  2002).  The 
critical voices, which reappeared particularly by the beginning of this century, suggested 
greater flexibility in rules and a greater balance between nominal and real aims, namely 
for:  the  possibility,  in  a  situation  of  economic  crisis,  of  governments  having  to  use   12 
restrictive  fiscal  policies,  which  would  be  counterproductive;  the  fact  that  continued 
situations  of  stagnation  or  poor  economic  growth  were  not  considered  as  exceptions 
regarding the application of the excessive deficit procedure; and the possibility that the 
time period for correcting excessive deficits was clearly too short. 
￿
This discussion, and above all the economic difficulties felt by several countries at the 
beginning of the present century (particularly France and Germany, the “locomotives” of 
the euro zone), led in 2003 to a suspension in the application of the SGP (European 
Council, 2003) and two years later to its reform (European Council, 2005). The major 
features of such reform included: an extension of the deadline for correcting excessive 
deficits; the need for greater attention to the evolution of the structural deficit and the 
weight  of  public  debt  on  the  GDP  as  central  elements  of  fiscal  sustainability  in  the 
medium and long run; the consideration of continued situations of low effective product 
growth  (below  potential)  as  exceptions  to  sanctions;  and  the  inclusion  of  various 
“pertinent” factors that could ease situations that would fit into the concept of excessive 
public deficit. 
 
These changes have determined greater room for manoeuvre for national governments to 
deal with specific or asymmetric shocks, in this sense making the Pact more “flexible”, 
considering the classification of “ideal” fiscal rules proposed by Kopits and Symansky 
(1998). However, by including a great diversity of “pertinent” factors in the context of 
the (non) excessive nature of a public deficit, the doors seem to have opened (Alves and 
Afonso, 2007) for a less “enforceable” Pact (or more “stupid” from the point of view of 
its application). In other words, new doubts have been raised as to its capacity to ensure 
the sustainability of public accounts in the euro zone, which are shared both by defenders 
of the original SGP (e.g. Buti et al., 2005) and by its critics (e.g. Buiter, 2005; Allington 
and McCombie, 2007). 
 
In terms of another central element, that is, the size, uses and outlooks relative to the 
community budget, figures 1 to 3 are particularly enlightening.  
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Thus, the EU budget maintains a very small weight, representing little more than 1% of 
the Union’s GDP, in a situation that contrasts greatly with those of federations (or similar 
political units) with a single currency, particularly with that of the United States.  
 
Most of the revenue comes from the so-called “GNP resource”, in view of the successive 
drop  in  the  importance  of  customs  duties  and  agricultural  duties  and  the  stagnation 
followed by the drop in relevance of the “VAT resource”. In other words, not only is the 
budget small, but also resources seem to be not truly “own”, contrary to what their name 
suggests, leaving the EU in a very limited context of financial autonomy (Cieslukowski 
and Alves, 2006). 
 
Fig. 1 – Composition of the community budget revenue (billion euros) 
 
Source: EU site, http://europa.eu.int  
 
Equally significant is the fact that a very substantial part of this small budget is devoted 
to one of the most controversial (and probably most unfair) policies in the Union: the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP).  Despite  its  successive  fall  in  importance  in  the 
budget (fig. 2), in favour of the policies for economic and social cohesion, the CAP 
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Fig. 2 – Composition of community budget expenses 
 
Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006) 
 
These circumstances do not seem likely to change in the short run, as can be seen from 
the analysis of the financial perspectives for the period 2007-2013 (fig. 3), with a very 
low  ceiling  maintained  for  budget  size  (less  than  1.3%  of  the  Union’s  GNP)  and 
significant expenses in the area of agriculture. Some reformulation of fundamental aims 
can be seen, particularly for competitiveness and cohesion, following the attempt for real 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, but keeping expenses with new challenges in the 
Union (such as foreign policy and common defence, the development of citizenship, the 
strengthening of the space of freedom, security and justice) at a very disappointing level. 
 
Fig. 3 – Financial perspectives for the period 2007-2013 
 
Source: EU site, http://europa.eu.int  
   15 
4. Fiscal federalism in the EU: how far are we? 
If  we  compare  the  solution  adopted  in  the  context  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  its 
subsequent reforms with the main ideas highlighted in the review of the literature on 
fiscal federalism, there seems to be quite a large gap between the present EU framework 
with  regard  to  the  performance  in  the  field  of  macroeconomic  stabilisation  (and,  in 
general, to the definition and execution of fiscal policies) and what should occur in the 
context of a true Federation. 
 
This discrepancy is even greater in three areas: 
 
1) The community budget is small, about 1% of the Union’s GDP, and no significant 
changes seem to be expected in it for the next few years. Added to the fact that almost 
half the budget is destined for the Common Agricultural Policy, this means that it cannot 
correspond to the functions of macroeconomic stabilisation that central budgets assume 
in the main federations. 
 
2)  Some  of  the  recent  developments  in  the  theory  of  fiscal  federalism  highlight  the 
relevance  of  the  creation  of  “hard  budget  constraints”  as  a  way  of  preserving  and 
developing the market economy, in the framework of a highly decentralised federation; 
therefore,  there  seems  to  be  greater  synchronisation  between  the  theory  of  fiscal 
federalism and the solution adopted for defining and executing fiscal policy in the EU, 
which  is  based  particularly,  as  mentioned,  on  the  development  and  application  of 
compulsory restrictive rules. 
 
Nevertheless, the said authors admitted that it could be enough to combine the prohibition 
of  monetary  financing  of  the  debt  and  bail-out  behaviour  on  the  part  of  the  federal 
government with the non-existence of exaggerated intergovernmental transfers and with 
more  efficient  functioning  of  the  credit  markets  in  order  to  generate  responsible 
behaviour of the sub-central fiscal authorities.  
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In the European case, however, as these prohibitions exist, compulsory rules have also 
been adopted: nevertheless, as has also been mentioned, such rules are not consensual 
and  do  not  even  seem  to  be  transparent  enough  or  applicable  in  such  as  way  as  to 
promote the necessary fiscal discipline. 
 
3) In the European case, not only is there a lack of credibility in the adopted rules, but 
also the coordination of non-monetary policies seems to be very insufficient is only just 
beginning,  in  a  situation  that  is  hardly  favourable  to  obtaining  coherence  among  the 
various national fiscal policies and between these policies and the common monetary 
policy. In the context of a federal economic organisation, this coherence would be largely 
guaranteed, even in the context of broad decentralisation of policies, since there would at 
least be institutions that guaranteed the definition of common fundamental aims and of 
general paths to follow, as well as effectively overseeing compliance with the rules. 
 
In  this  context,  and  admitting  that  the  fiscal  and  budgetary  policies  could  still  be 
mobilised for macroeconomic purposes and, since it seems difficult, in the short (and 
possibly medium) run to pursue this aim in a (traditional) framework of centralisation, 
with a wider community budget, the debate mentioned in the previous section and the 
lessons of the fiscal federalism theory could indicate the following lines of evolution, 
which differ according to the time horizon. 
 
1) In the medium to long run, and in order to bring about and consolidate the politico-
institutional transformation that would lead to the creation of a “Federation of Nation-
States”,  it  would  be  difficult  not  to  keep  moving  towards  an  effective  reform of  the 
community  budget,  which  enables  its  expansion  to  levels  compatible  with  the  new 
demands and new challenges facing the Union and, in particular, to develop an effective 
mechanism for stabilisation regarding adverse shocks. 
 
Studies recently carried out by the European Commission (2004) could, in this field, 
constitute a good starting point, both from the point of view of type of instruments that 
could shape new own resources for the community budget, and from the point of view of   17 
a summary of the main problems that are raised in order to implement them. On the one 
hand, these are associated with questions of fiscal harmonisation and, on the other, the 
necessary substitution of national fiscal burden (as well as national public expenses by 
Union expenses), as the only way in which the acceptance of European citizens could be 
considered. 
 
In any case, it is not to be expected, nor is it politically desirable (since it would possibly 
imply a situation of excessive centralisation), that the community budget should be, even 
in the long run, similar in size to the central budgets of certain existing federations (e.g. 
that  of  the  United  States).  In  fact,  some  studies  even  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the 
Maastricht  programme  for  the  single  European  currency,  already  anticipated  this 
situation:  MacDougall  (1977)  mentioned  around  5%  to  7%  of  the  GNP;  Lamfalussy 
(1989) referred to about 3% of the GNP. In either case, however, these values are far 
greater than those seen today. 
 
2) In the short-run, and bearing in mind the political and economic difficulties derived 
from  what  was  mentioned  in  the  previous  point,  a  more  efficient  resolution  of  the 
fundamental  issues  raised  (namely,  efficiency  in  combating  the  negative  effects  of 
specific and asymmetric shocks, the balance between nominal and real macroeconomic 
aims, the strengthening of the coherence of policy mix and the maximisation of overall 
well being) would seem to suggest three more immediate actions: 
 
a)  a  strengthening  of  the  coordination  of  national  fiscal  policies,  requiring  a 
marked  change  in  their  institutional  framework;  as  mentioned  by  Pisani-Ferry 
(2002), it would be important to adopt a code of conduct for economic policy, 
establish a compulsory agreement of reciprocal consultation for Members of the 
euro  zone  and  of  the  Commission  before  taking  the  relevant  macroeconomic 
policy  decisions,  to  transform  the  Eurogroup  into  an  executive  entity  with 
decision-making capacity through a qualified majority, to transform the (national) 
stability programmes into true instruments of coordination and supervision and to 
create  constructive  dialogue  between  the  Eurogroup  and  the  European  Central   18 
Bank, allowing useful and coherent interaction in terms of structural reforms and 
macroeconomic policy; 
 
b) a credible reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, as a relevant mechanism for 
the supervision and maintenance of fiscal discipline; with regard to this, although 
the 2005 “review” raised the SGP’s degree of flexibility, it does not seem to have 
been in a way that has strengthened its credibility, in particular in terms of its 
sanctionary nature, in view of the excessive number of causes that may allow it 
not  to  be  applied.  In  this  sense,  an  adjustment  of  the  existing  characteristics, 
namely  considering  a  more  restrictive  and  explicit  list  of  “escape  clauses”, 
together with the integration of some measures proposed over the last few years 
by different economists, including the proposal to evolve towards a pact based on 
public  debt  sustainability,  as  well  as  the  inclusion  of  measures  that  could 
incentive coordination measures, would seem to be essential elements; 
 
c) While a more significant expansion of the community budget is not possible, 
the effectiveness of the stabilising response to shocks of a specific or asymmetric 
nature may require a limited mechanism of shock absorption to be created.  
 
Following Goodhart and Smith (1993), in order to be efficient and not to place 
excessive  difficulties  of  implementation  at  various  levels,  such  a  mechanism 
should meet several requirements: firstly, it should be limited so that community 
action  only  occurs  in  the  event  of  serious  economic  difficulties;  secondly,  it 
should be temporary so that it does not promote dependence and maintenance of 
the status quo rather than stabilisation, which means that its source of activation 
should only be negative changes in economic activity, and it should be suspended 
as  soon  as  these  changes  cease;  in  the  third  place,  its  impact  should  only  be 
produced during the stage of minor economic growth (and not extended beyond 
that), which means that the mechanism must be based on an indicator closely 
associated with fluctuations in real income; finally, there principle of subsidiarity   19 
should be effective, meaning that help should only occur where the deceleration 
of economic activity is caused by specific national factors. 
 
In this context, it should also be noted that, since the beginning of the 90s, several 
attempts have been presented to create a “European scheme of fiscal transfers”, 
which  have  been  aimed  at  these  kind  of  goals  (e.g.  Melitz  and  Vori,  1993; 
Italianer  and  Pisani-Ferry,  1994;  Hammond  and  von  Hagen,  1998).  Although 
these have been unsuccessful in terms of policy adoption, some of them contain 
significant  possibilities  to  be  explored  in  the  framework  that  we  have  just 
defended. 
 
Also with regard to this, and in a similar way  to that mentioned in section 2 
relative  to  “income  sharing  mechanism(s)”,  if  this  transfer  system  existed,  it 
should not be too extensive, otherwise it could put fiscal discipline at risk, by 
encouraging increasingly lax behaviour at the level of public accounts. 
 
In addition, as a result of the lessons of fiscal federalism, evolution should be marked, at 
a more general level, by making legal provisions for a suitable and transparent sharing of 
competences at the various levels of government.  
 
In this context, this would ideally result from a true European Constitution, which would 
fully provide for the principles of decentralisation and of subsidiarity, explicitly placing 
only the clearly supranational fields (e.g. defence, foreign policy, monetary policy and 
fiscal competition) as “federal” government competences.  
 
In these fields, the unanimous decision rule should be replaced with a simplified rule of 
qualified majority: this would mean that decisions would be more likely to pass in the 
central  organs  of  the  Union  and  would  reduce  the  possibility  of  creating  blocking 
minorities, thus raising the Union’s decision-making and intervention capacity, as well as 
contributing to a reduction in its “democratic deficit”. 
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5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper has been to compare the present process of definition and 
implementation  of  fiscal  policies  in  the  EU  with  the  main  conclusions  of  the  fiscal 
federalism theory, in order to draw possible lessons for the EU’s future evolution, namely 
towards a possible “Federation of Nation-States”. 
 
This comparison supports the idea that the major conclusions of such theory are largely 
compatible  with  the  emergence  with  a  largely  decentralised  “Federation”  in  Europe, 
including  the  possibility  of  running  significant  positive  welfare  effects.  However,  the 
comparison also shows that there still a large gap between the present system and the one 
that would result from a large application of the fiscal federalism theory.  
 
The gap is particularly  relevant in the domain of macroeconomic stabilisation, where 
three elements should be stressed: a deficient definition and capacity of application of 
fiscal rules (even after the reform of the SGP); an insufficient degree of coordination of 
national  fiscal  policies;  and  a  very  limited  financial  autonomy  for  the  centre,  as  the 
community  budget  has  a  very  limited  dimension.  Also,  the  perspectives  for  the  near 
future do not seem to include significant changes, as the failed Constitutional Treaty did 
not include important alterations in this field and the same seems to happen within the 
actual negotiations towards a “Reforming Treaty”. 
 
However, it seems to be arguable that it would be very important to modify this situation, 
with changes happening at two temporal levels: in the short-run, a strengthening on the 
coordination of national fiscal policies (requiring a marked  change in its institutional 
framework), together with a credible reform of the SGP (as a relevant mechanism for the 
maintenance  of  fiscal  discipline)  and  the  creation  of  a  limited  mechanism  of  shock 
absorption (in order to increase the effectiveness of response to asymmetric shocks); in 
the medium to long run, a significant increase in the dimension of the EU budget, giving 
the EU a degree of financial autonomy compatible with the need to face new challenges 
and new demands. 
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In addition, as a result of the lessons of fiscal federalism, evolution should be marked, at 
a more general level, by making legal provisions for a suitable and transparent sharing of 
competences at the various levels of government. This would ideally result from a true 
European Constitution, which would fully provide for the principles of decentralisation 
and  subsidiarity,  explicitly  placing  only  the  clearly  supranational  fields  (e.g.  defence, 
foreign  policy,  monetary  policy  and  fiscal  competition)  as  “federal”  government 
competences.  
 
In these fields, the unanimous decision rule should be replaced with a simplified rule of 
qualified majority: this would mean that decisions would be more likely to pass in the 
central  organs  of  the  Union  and  would  reduce  the  possibility  of  creating  blocking 
minorities, thus raising the Union’s decision-making and intervention capacity, as well as 
contributing to a reduction in its “democratic deficit”. 
 
The unsuccessful project of Constitutional Treaty included several changes that would 
put the present situation closer to the one defended in this paper, namely the elimination 
of the 3-pillar institutional structure, the increase in the number of areas with majority 
voting,  the  alteration  on  the  rules  for  qualified  majority  or  the  attempt  to  present  a 
distribution of competences between the Members and the Union.  
 
It seems possible that some of these changes will be included in the “Reforming Treaty”, 
now  in  negotiations.  However,  the  inexistence  of  significant  modifications  in  the 
economic field, the maintenance of some  critical aspects of the Constitutional Treaty 
(Alves, 2007) and even the lack of transparency resulting from the negotiation process 
will still leave the situation far from what would be desirable. 
   22 
References 
 
Allington, N. and McCombie, J. (2007) ‘Nonsense Upon Stilts: An Assessment of the European Stability 
and Growth Pact and How It May Be Reformed’, in John McCombie and Carlos Rodriguez (eds.), 
The European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 26-49. 
Alves, R.H. (2007) ‘European Union and (Fiscal) Federalism’, in John McCombie and Carlos Rodriguez 
(eds.), The European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 154-172. 
Alves, R.H. (2000) Políticas Fiscais Nacionais e União Económica e Monetária na Europa, Bolsa de 
Valores de Lisboa e Porto, 2nd edition. 
Alves, R.H. and Afonso, O. (2007) ‘The New Stability and Growth Pact: More Flexible, Less Stupid?”, 
Intereconomics, forthcoming. 
Arestis, P., McCauley, K. and Sawyer, M. (2001) ‘An Alternative Stability Pact for the European Union’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 25, pp. 113-130. 
Bahl, R. and Linn, J. (1992) Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries, Oxford University Press. 
Baldwin, R. and Wyplosz, C. (2006) The Economics of the European Union, McGraw-Hill, 2
nd edition. 
Bayoumi,  T.,  and  Masson,  P.R.  (1995).‘Fiscal  Flows  in  the  United  States  and  Canada:  Lessons  for 
Monetary Union in Europe’, European Economic Review, 39. 
Begg, I., Buti, M., Weale, M., Enderlein, H. and Schelkle, W. (2004) ‘Symposium Reforming Fiscal Policy 
Co-ordination under EMU: What Should Become of the Stability and Growth Pact.’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol 42, issue 5, pp.1023-59. 
Buiter,  W.  (2005)  ‘The  ' Sense  and  Nonsense  of  Maastricht'   Revisited:  What  Have  We  Learnt  About 
Stabilization In EMU?’ CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5405. 
Buiter, W., Corsetti, G. and Roubini, N. (1993) ‘Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of 
Maastricht’ in Economic Policy: a European Forum, April, pp. 58-100. 
Buti,  M.,  Eijffinger,  S.  and  Franco,  D.  (2003)  ‘Revisiting  EMU' s  Stability  Pact:  A  Pragmatic  Way 
Forward’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 19 (1), pp. 100-111. 
Buti, M., Eijffinger, S. and Franco, D. (2005) ‘The Stability Pact Pains: A Forward-Looking Assessment of 
the Reform Debate.’ CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5216. 
Casella, A. (1999) ‘Tradable Deficit Permits: Efficient Implementation of the Stability Pact in the European 
Monetary Union.’ Economic Policy, vol. 29, pp. 323-361. 
Cieslukowski, M. and Alves, R. H. (2006) ‘Financial Autonomy of the EU After the Enlargement’, FEP 
Working Papers, nº 217, July.   23 
Collignon, S. (2004) ‘The End of the Stability and Growth Pact?’, International Economics and Economic 
Policy, vol. 1, pp. 15-19. 
Creel, J. (2003) ‘Ranking Fiscal Policy Rules: the Golden Rule of Public Finance versus the Stability and 
Growth Pact.’ Documents de Travail de l' OFCE 2003-04, Observatoire Français des Conjonctures 
Économiques, July. 
De Grauwe, P. (2005) The Economics of Monetary Integration, Oxford University Press, 6
th edition. 
Enrich,  P.D.  (1996)  ‘Saving  the  States  from  Themselves:  Commerce  Clause  Constraints  on  State  Tax 
Incentives for Business’, Harvard Law Review, 110, pp. 378-461. 
European Commission (2004), ‘Financing the European Union’, Commission Report on the Operation of the 
Own Resources System, COM (2004) 505. 
European Council (2005) ‘Presidency Conclusions, European Council Brussels.’ Concl 1, 7619/1/05. 
Available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/84335.pdf  
European  Council  (2003)  ‘2546
th  Council  Meeting  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  (Press  Release)’, 
14492/1/03 REV 1 (en), Brussels, available at  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/78051.pdf  
European Council (1997) ‘Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact.’ Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C 236/1. 
Feldstein,  M.  and  Wrobel,  M.V.  (1998),  ‘Can  State  Taxes  Redistribute  Income?’,  Journal  of  Public 
Economics, 68-3, pp. 369-396. 
Flatters, F., Henderson, V. and Mieszkowski, P. (1974) ‘Public Goods, Efficiency and Regional Fiscal 
Equalization’, Journal of Public Economics, 3, pp. 99-112. 
Goodhart, C. and Smith, S. (1993) ‘Stabilization’, The Economics of Community Public Finance, European 
Economy, n. 5, pp. 417-455. 
Hammond,  G.  and  von  Hagen,  Juergen  (1998)  ‘Insurance  Against  Asymmetric  Shocks:  An  Empirical 
Study for the European Community’, The Manchester School, 66, 3: 331-353. 
Inman,  R.  and  Rubinfeld,  D.  (1997)  ‘The  political  Economy  of  Federalism’,  in  Dennis  Mueller  (ed.), 
Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook, Cambridge University Press, pp. 73-105. 
Italianer, A. and Pisani-Ferry, J. (1994) ‘The regional-stabilisation properties of fiscal arrangements’, in 
Jorgen Mortensen (ed.), Improving economic and social cohesion in the European Community, St. 
Martin’s Press, pp. 155-194.   24 
Kenen, P.B. (1969) ‘The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View,’ in Robert Mundell and 
Alexander Swoboda (eds), Monetary Problems of the International Economy, University of Chicago 
Press. 
King, D. (1984) Fiscal Tiers: The Economics of Multi-Level Government, Allen & Unwin. 
Kopits, G. and Symansky, S. (1998) ‘Fiscal policy rules’, Occasional Paper 162. International Monetary 
Fund, Washington. 
Lamfalussy, A. (1989) ‘Macro-coordination of Fiscal Policies in an Economic and Monetary Union in 
Europe’, in Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community, Serviço das 
Publicações Oficiais das CE pp. 91-125. 
MacDougall, D. (1977) Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration, 
vol. I and II, Commission of the European Communities, Economic and Financial Series. 
McKinnon, R. (1997) ‘Market-Preserving Fiscal Federalism in the American Monetary Union’, in Mario 
Blejer and Teresa Ter-Minassian (eds.), Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance: Essays in 
Honor of Vito Tanzi, Routledge, pp. 73-93. 
McKinnon,  R.  (1997)  ‘EMU  as  a  Device  for  Collective  Action  Retrenchment’,  American  Economic 
Review, 87, pp. 227-229. 
Mélitz,  J.  e  Vori,  S.  (1993)  ‘National  Insurance  Against  Unevenly  Distributed  Shocks  in  a  European 
Monetary Union’, Recherches Economiques de Louvain, vol. 59, nº 1–2, pp. 81–104. 
Mundell, Robert A. (1961) ‘A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’, American Economic Review, vol. 51, 
nº 4, 657-665. 
Musgrave, R. (1983) ‘Who Should Tax, Where and What?, in Charles McLure (ed.), Tax Assignment in 
Federal Countries, Australian University Press, Camberra. 
Oates,  W.  (1999)  ‘An  Essay  on  Fiscal  Federalism’,  Journal  of  Economic  Literature,  vol.  37,  nº  2, 
September, pp. 1120-1149. 
Oates, W. (1998) ‘On the Welfare Gains from Fiscal Decentralization’, University of Maryland Economics 
Department WP 98-05. 
Oates, W. (1972) Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York. 
Oates, W. and Schwabb, R.M. (1996) ‘The Theory of Regulatory Federalism: The Case of Environmental 
Management’, in Wallace Oates (ed.), The Economics ot Environmental Regulation, Edward Elgar, 
pp. 319-331. 
Pauly, M. (1973) ‘Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good’, Journal of Public Economics, 2, pp. 35-
58.   25 
Pisani-Ferry, J. (2004) ‘Reforming the SGP: Does it matter? What should be done?’ in Roger Liddle and 
Maria João Rodrigues, (eds.), Economic Reform in Europe - Priorities for the next five years, Policy 
Network. 
Pisani-Ferry,  J.  (2002)  ‘Fiscal  Discipline  and  Policy  Coordination  in  the  Eurozone:  Assessment  and 
Proposals’, Note for the GEA meeting of 16 April. 
Prodi, R. (2002) Interview with Le Monde, 17 October. 
Rubio, O. and  Figueras, D.  (1998) ‘Federalismo  y Unión Monetaria en Europa’, Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales, P.T. nº 10/98. 
Sala-i-Martin, X., and Sachs, J. (1992) ‘Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for 
Europe from the United  States’,  in Canzoneri, Grilli, and Masson (eds), Establishing a Central 
Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the US, Cambridge University Press. 
Schuman, R. (1963) Penser l’Europe, Nigel Edit. 
Shah, A. (1994) The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Developing and Emerging Market 
Economies, World Bank. 
Solow, R. (2004) ‘Is Fiscal Policy Possible?’, in Solow, R. (ed.), Structural Reform and Macroeconomic 
Policy, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Spahn, P.B. (1994), ‘Fiscal Federalism: a Survey on the Literature’, in Jorgen Mortenses (ed.), Improving 
economic and social cohesion in the European Community, St. Martin’s Press, pp. 145-154. 
Tiebout, C. (1956) ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, Journal of Political Economy, 64, pp. 416-424. 
Usher, D. (1995) The Uneasy Case for Equalization Payments, The Fraser Institute, Vancouver. 
Weingast,  B.  (1995)  ‘The  Economic  Role  of  Political  Institutions:  Market-Preserving  Federalism  and 
Economic Development’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 11, pp. 1-31. 
Wyplosz, C. (2005) ‘Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules’, National Institute Economic Review, 191, pp. 
70-84. 
 Recent FEP Working Papers 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿" ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿
￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿   ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿% ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   &￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ , - ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. / - ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ !￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿’ ! ￿ ￿* + ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ! ￿ ￿* , ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ - 1 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿/ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿   ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 7 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿8 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿￿ 2 ’ ￿
’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ !3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ &￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   3 ￿! ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ !3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ !￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿$ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ !3 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿" ￿
& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ !3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿# ￿ ( ￿ ￿ !3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿
$ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿# ￿ ( ￿ ￿ !3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿# ￿ ( ￿ ￿ !3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿   ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ; ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ &￿9 , : ; 7+ ; ; 9 ￿&￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿
& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿&￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿   7￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =￿ ￿ ￿ - 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿   ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ 7
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿7￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 = 2 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =￿ ￿ ￿ - 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿( - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" + ￿
> ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" 2 ￿
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ $ ￿ ￿ &￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿ ￿ A ￿& ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ C ￿ D￿ C ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿
( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" 5 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =￿ ￿ =# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿ =￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
( . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" 6 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ E ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 3 ￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ E ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿0 ￿ - 1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ & ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ E ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿
4 ￿ $ 7￿   ￿ ￿ ￿D￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" ￿￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" " ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ 2 ’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ E ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% ￿ $ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ + ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ , - ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. / - ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ !￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( - ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ E F ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿
￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ & ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ D  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ - 1 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 5 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =￿ ￿ =# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿ =￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
( . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ - 1 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 6 ￿
. ￿ , ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ !￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ A 7 ￿ ￿￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ &￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿
￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿